ZGram - 4/3/2002 - "The Worst-Case Scenario"

[irimland@zundelsite.org]

Today's telling ZGram as things look very dangerous indeed:

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The Worst-Case Scenario
By Edward N. Luttwak
Time.com
4-3-2

Few still hope that Yasser Arafat could ever be Israel's partner in 
peace, but many now feel that his predicament could become the 
catalyst of a much larger conflict. If it began to unfold, it could 
unleash pent-up forces and take on a disastrous momentum of its own. 
When the possibility arose that Arafat might be killed in the ruins 
of his headquarters, there was undisguised panic among Arab 
governments. What they dreaded also greatly alarmed their European 
counterparts, as well as the U.S. and even the Israelis themselves: 
uncontrollable mass demonstrations in Arab capitals that might compel 
reluctant rulers to try to attack Israel in turn.

How would it begin? In one grim scenario, it would start with Egypt's 
Hosni Mubarak, who is in the most exposed position of all. His 
controlled media have long been replete with fervent anti-Israeli 
propaganda in a deliberate attempt to deflect attention from 
corruption and mismanagement at home. Endless television replays of 
the most brutal scenes of the Israeli occupation have hammered home 
the message that Egypt's most urgent concern is the plight of the 
Palestinians. At the same time, what is still a military-based regime 
justifies large expenditures on the armed forces amid extreme poverty 
by boasting of their strength. Mubarak therefore risks becoming the 
prisonerof his own propaganda: If Palestine is all-important and 
Egypt that strong, why not use its strength against the Israelis? The 
least dangerous Egyptian move would be disastrous in its 
consequences. Violating Anwar Sadat's peace treaty, cutting itself 
off from vital U.S. aid, the Egyptian army could send part of its 
vast forces--say, the four tank divisions and eight mechanized 
divisions with 1,600 battle tanks, including first-line U.S. 
M1A1s--into the Sinai peninsula to threaten the Israeli frontier. 
Compelling the Israelis to mobilize their own army, which would very 
likely freeze any further action against the Palestinians, would make 
sense as a piece of military gamesmanship. But strategically it would 
be catastrophic, because if the Egyptians acted, Syria's young and 
insecure President Bashar Assad would most likely feel compelled to 
compete with them by sending his own armored forces--seven divisions 
with 2,000 tanks--to threaten the Golan frontier. And then even King 
Abdullah of Jordan, who greatly values his peace treaty with Israel, 
might come under irresistible pressure from his Palestinian subjects 
to send his two armored and two mechanized divisions, equipped with 
some 700 tanks, opposite the Jordanian frontier.

None of this need be done with any intention of actually fighting to 
provoke a war nonetheless. Other Arab governments could be propelled 
by a mounting spiral of popular enthusiasm to send their own forces 
to reinforce the frontline states. That would cue Saddam Hussein to 
demand his opportunity to send armored forces to threaten Israel by 
marching through Jordan or Syria or both. The King of Jordan would 
dread such contaminating assistance in his territory, and Assad of 
Syria too would fear it, but if the rhetorical escalation of the 
leaders and popular agitation heat up the climate, it might become 
impossible to deny passage to Iraqi forces in part because they might 
bring with them the chemical or even biological weapons that evoke 
the special enthusiasm of Hamas and other fundamentalists. Finally, 
there is the Hizballah militia in southern Lebanon, already deployed 
close to Israel's northern frontier with hundreds of bombardment 
rockets ready to strike as far away as the port city of Haifa.

Competing mobilizations amid mounting waves of popular enthusiasm 
would be a direct replay of what happened in 1967, which back then 
triggered humiliating Arab military defeats and the Israeli 
occupation of Gaza, the West Bank and the Golan Heights, which still 
endures. For that very reason the scenario might seem exceedingly 
improbable. As the frequent references to 7th century events in 
political speeches show, Arabs have excellent historical memories. 
Even those born after 1967 know the story very well. Certainly each 
government has powerful reasons to refrain from anything more than 
diplomatic protests even if Arafat is killed. Egypt would lose the 
U.S. aid that pays for the very weapons it would deploy ($2 billion a 
year) and for much of its daily bread. Jordan is likewise dependent, 
Syria's equipment is too outdated to risk war, and even Saddam 
Hussein can hardly threaten Israel with ballistic missiles and 
weapons of mass destruction whose existence he strenuously denies.

But madness is rare only among individuals. It is quite common in 
entire nations. The Israelis themselves might reasonably be said to 
be mad to think they can have a tranquil occupation of Palestinian 
areas--actually they are merely split down the middle between those 
who have long wanted to withdraw and those who think land is more 
important than peace. As for the Arab leaders, what might cause them 
to behave irrationally is their lack of legitimacy--nobody elected 
them, very few of their subjects respect their competence, and lately 
many are seen as the slavish stooges of the U.S.

If the Arab-buildup scenario came to pass, the Israelis would be 
forced to mobilize some 425,000 reservists to staff their armed 
forces, a large part of their entire able-bodied population. Because 
it would paralyze their economy and indeed society as a whole, 
mobilization cannot last much more than a few weeks at most. Unless 
diplomatic pressure induces the Arab forces to withdraw again, the 
Israelis would attack to force them into flight or destroy them, as 
in 1967.

But for the Israelis such a war would not be a repeat of 1967. Since 
then, the military balance has moved greatly in favor of Israel. 
Almost useless in stopping suicide bombers, downright clumsy in 
facing stone-throwing teenagers, the Israeli armed forces are much 
better at doing what they are trained and equipped to do: smash 
regular forces with superior firepower and skill. With some 400 
first-line strike aircraft and a large inventory of guided weapons 
(Israel is a major producer and exporter), they have a combination of 
weapon loads and accuracy that would be devastating to Arab ground 
forces. If Arab air forces were to intervene to protect them, it is 
believed that the Israelis would shoot down at least 30 aircraft for 
each loss of their own (in 1982 they scored 80-0 against the 
Syrians). The Israeli army's 11 armored divisions would be 
outnumbered, but Israeli armored columns are trained to move 
significantly faster than their enemies, to outmaneuver them if the 
terrain allows, while their gunnery--100% the product of female 
instructors--is thought to be far superior.

The Israelis would have no surefire way of stopping the Hizballah 
from launching its huge inventory of Iranian-supplied bombardment 
rockets at the villages and cities of northern Israel. Although 
grossly inaccurate, they would still inflict damage. Syria also has 
hundreds of bombardment rockets, some with chemical warheads, but 
unlike the Hizballah guerrillas, it must fear Israeli retaliation. No 
Arab air force is likely to be much of a threat to Israeli cities, 
while if Saddam Hussein chooses to blow his cover by launching the 
handful of ballistic missiles he has kept hidden all these years, 
they are unlikely to do much damage. In 1991 the 50 Scud missiles 
fired into Israel frightened many but killed nobody. Even if Iraqi 
missiles have nerve gas or anthrax warheads, they are unlikely to 
kill more than a few. The theoretical potency of agents like VX--one 
tiny drop kills--or anthrax is defeated by the mechanics of 
distribution and dilution. A missile warhead would have to open up to 
release its cargo on top of a crowd to kill many, and that is a far 
more advanced capability than Saddam Hussein could possibly have.

But, of course, even a splendid victory would be disastrous for 
Israel, because at great expense in wealth and blood, it would gain 
nothing in the aftermath that it did not have before the current 
crisis: safety from invasion. And any outcome at all would be 
disastrous for Western and especially American interests. Nobody can 
even bear to contemplate an utterly improbable Israeli defeat. But if 
Arab leaders are humiliatingly defeated, the most likely outcome of a 
war, the fundamentalists would have their first real chance of coming 
to power. Arafat's ineffectual strategy and utter recklessness have 
thus caused a crisis that induces all, even the Israelis, to wish him 
a long life, for his death might precipitate the most damaging of 
wars.

Edward N. Luttwak is the author of
Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace

http://www.time.com/time/covers/1101020408/scenario.html

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