- Ruling by Justice Pierre Blais to continue
        detention of Ernst Zundel - September 22, 2004
 
     
     
    The Honourable Mr. Justice Blais - Ottawa, Ontario, 
    September 22, 2004. 
    
      
         
        - IN THE MATTER OF a certificate signed pursuant to subsection
 
        
      
      
         
        - 77(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C.
 
        
      
      
         
        - 2001, c. 27 (the "Act");
 
        
      
      
         
        - AND IN THE MATTER OF THE Referral of that certificate of the
 
        
      
      
         
        - Federal Court of Canada pursuant to subsection 77(1),
 
        
      
      
         
        - sections 78 and 80 of the Act;
 
        
      
      
         
        - AND IN THE MATTER OF ERNST ZUNDEL
 
        
      
      
         
        - REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
 
        
      
     
      
      
      
    (1) Pursuant to subsections 83(2) and 83(3) of the act, the
    Court has to review whether Mr. Zundel's detention should be continued. 
    (2) From May 1, 2003 to January 21, 2004, the Court has
    heard evidence provided by the Ministers in public and also in camera, and
    evidence provided in public by Mr. Zundel. 
    (3) After assessing that evidence on January 21, 2004, the
    Court has rendered a decision to the effect that Mr.Zundel's detention
    should be continued. 
    (4) Pursuant to subsection 83(2) of the Act after 6 months,
    the Court has the duty to re-examine whether the detention of Mr. Zundel
    should continue. 
    (5) Under subsection 83(3), the Court should decide that the
    detention continues if the Ministers provide evidence that there are
    reasonable ground to believe that Mr. Zundel continues to be a danger to
    national security or to the safety of any person, or, that Mr. Zundel is
    unlikely to appear at proceedings for removal. As Mr. Lindsay, counsel for
    Mr. Zundel suggested, the real question is "What has changed since
    then?" 
    (6) After discussions between the parties, this Spring, it
    was decided that Mr. David Steward, who is an employee of CSIS, could
    testify on the material that was filed by the Ministers. 
    (7) It was understood at the very beginning that Mr. Stewart
    will testify on unclassified material and that all questions asked to Mr.
    Stewart by counsel for Mr. Zundel or by counsel for the Ministers would
    address only the unclassified material. 
    (8) Referring to the transcript of those 7 days, the Court
    had to intervene often to make sure that no question would be addressed to
    the witness that could inadvertently disclose some classified information
    which would be injurious to national security. 
    (9) Counsel for Mr. Zundel and his predecessor suggested
    many times that different witnesses would testify. At the last minute,
    counsel for Mr. Zundel decided not to bring those witnesses to testify. 
    (10) The witnesses which counsel for Mr. Zundel wanted to
    bring forward to testify included a former counsel for Mr. Zundel, who is
    now a judge of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, the leader of the
    Canadian Jewish Congress, a leader of B'Nai Brith Canada, an author and a
    journalist for the Globe and Mail. All those subpoenas were quashed after a
    hearing and are the subject of another decision rendered on June 23, 2004. 
    (11) In my decision of January 21, 2004, I indicated that
    Mr. Zundel did not provide evidence of his real relationship with the
    individuals and the organizations that are mentioned in the summary that was
    provided to Mr. Zundel in May 2003. 
    (12) Mr. Zundel decided not to address those issues and not
    to clarify his relationship with those individuals and organizations. Mr.
    Zundel decided to demonstrate that he is more or less a victim of a vendetta
    by CSIS against him, and tried by different allegations to demonstrate that
    CSIS has a strong bias against him and is determined to deport Mr. Zundel at
    any price. 
    (13) Counsel for Mr. Zundel raised an issue regarding the
    disclosure of such information that would be injurious to national security.
    On two occasions, I said "could be injurious to national security"
    when I should have said "would be injurious to national security".
    In fact, the remark by Mr. Lindsay was right. Nevertheless, there was no
    prejudice because when I made that particular finding, I always had in mind
    that the classified information and evidence that were provided in camera by
    the Ministers are confidential and that disclosure of any part of that
    evidence would be injurious to national security. 
    Obviously, the wording is important; nevertheless, what is
    imperative is that the designated judge has the duty to make sure that any
    classified information is not going to be made public if its disclosure
    would be injurious to national security, referring to section 78 of the Act. 
    (14) If Mr. Lindsay is right when he says that I have made a
    mistake once or twice in using the word "could", he is wrong when
    he says that I applied the wrong test, because in fact, I have applied the
    right test and I have reviewed periodically the evidence that was received
    in camera to make sure that if it was possible, I would have disclosed part
    of it to Mr. Zundel, pursuant to the Act. Nevertheless, my review of the
    information and evidence provided in camera by the Ministers led me to
    conclude that this classified material is relevant but that its disclosure
    would be injurious to national security or to the safety of any person. 
    (15) Counsel for Mr. Zundel spent a lot of time in his oral
    representations identifying some technical errors that could have been made
    during the long process. In my view, the time would have been better spent
    providing evidence to demonstrate the real relationship between Mr. Zundel
    and the individuals and organizations that were identified in the summary.
    Counsel for Mr. Zundel also spent a lot of time trying to demonstrate the
    interest of the court in hearing about the influence of the Canadian Jewish
    organizations and the pressures that those organizations put on the
    Ministers at different moments, pressures which culminate to the issuance of
    the certificate. 
    (16) As I stated in a previous decision, it is no secret
    that the Canadian Jewish organizations placed a lot of pressure on ministers
    and different levels of government, insisting that different measures should
    be taken against Mr. Zundel; for example the Canadian Jewish organizations
    exerted a lot of pressure to ensure that the Canadian government would not
    allow Mr. Zundel to reenter the country from the United States. In fact,
    they did not succeed. 
    (17) The pressures that were placed on the federal
    government and particularly the Ministers issuing the certificate are well
    known and were made in public. 
    (18) In fact, the question that has to be addressed is not
    whether there was pressure, but rather, whether the certificate issued by
    the Ministers is reasonable. 
    (19) We are not there yet. The hearing on the reasonableness
    of the certificate is still ongoing. Nevertheless, I have a duty to
    re-examine whether the detention should continue. 
    (20) Finally, counsel for Mr. Zundel suggests that the
    evidence that is provided in camera about Mr. Zundel created an unbalanced
    position and an untenable position to respond. 
    (21) Mr. Lindsay suggests that he should be allowed to ask
    questions about the secret evidence which is classified information, and if
    answers are provided to those questions, it would be easier for him to
    adequately represent his client. 
    (22) In fact, Mr. Lindsay suggests that unless he gets some
    answers to those questions, it will be very difficult, if not impossible for
    him to make meaningful submissions about the reasonableness of the
    certificate, and or the "issue of detention". Mr. Lindsay decided
    to read those questions in making his own representation as and I can assure
    Mr. Lindsay right now that those questions will be taken into consideration
    when the Court hears counsel for the Ministers in camera. 
    (23) The Federal Court of Appeal has explained the burden of
    proof on the review of detention in M.C.I. V. Thanabalasingham, [2004] F.C.J.
    No. 15, 2004 FCA 4: 
    
      The onus is always on the Minister to demonstrate there
      are reasons which warrant detention or continued detention. However once
      the Minister has made out a prima facie case for continued detention, the
      individual must lead some evidence or risk continued detention. 
     
    (24) On behalf of the Ministers, Mr. MacIntosh rightly
    suggests that the Ministers have met their burden: the Ministers have to
    demonstrate that there are reasonable grounds as to why Mr. Zundel should
    continue to remain in detention pursuant to section 83 of the Act. 
    (25) The role of the designated judge reviewing the reasons
    for continued detention is described by Justice Noel in Charkaoui, [20004] 1
    F.C.R. 528, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1119, 2003 FC 882, paragraph 36 (tab 4, the
    Ministers Book of Authorities): 
    
      The designated judge as the stage of reviewing the reasons
      for the arrest warrant and the continued [page 544] detention, must ask
      himself whether there is any evidence in support of the Minister's
      position that the respondent, since the beginning of his detention,
      remains a danger to national security or to the safety of any person or is
      unlikely to appear at a proceeding or for removal (see subsection 83(3) of
      the Act). I note that Parliament has used the word "or", which
      created an alternative between one of the reasons cited. Moreover, the
      designated judge, having given the respondent an opportunity to be heard,
      must ask himself whether the evidence presented by the respondent
      challenges the evidence in support of continued detention, if any. In
      doing so, he must consider all evidence of the parties (including that
      presented in the absence of the respondent). The initial onus is therefore
      on the Ministers, although it may shift to the respondent if the
      Ministers' evidence is sufficient. Where applicable, the respondent must
      in turn satisfy the designated judge that the continued detention is not
      justified. 
     
    (26) Again, it is important to quote former Chief Justice
    Thurlow in Attorney General of Canada v. Jolly [1975] F.C. 216 (C.A.), who
    has defined the standard of proof in immigration matters (Charkaoui
    decision, paragraph 38):  
    
      ...where the fact to be ascertained on the evidence is
      whether there are reasonable grounds for such a belief, rather than the
      existence of the fact itself, it seems to me in that to require proof of
      the fact itself and proceed to determine whether it has been established
      is to demand the proof of a different fact from that required to be
      ascertained. It seems to me that the use by the status of the expression,
      "reasonable grounds for believing" implies that the fact itself
      need not be established and that evidence which falls short of providing
      the subversive character of the organization will be sufficient if it is
      enough to show reasonable grounds for believing that the organization is
      one that advocates subversion by force, etc. In a close case the failure
      to observe this distinction and to resolve the precise [page 545] question
      dictated by the statutory wording can account for a difference in the
      result of an inquiry or an appeal. 
     
    (27) I would agree with counsel for the Ministers that even
    though counsel for Mr. Zundel has shown dissatisfaction with the disclosure
    of the evidence, Mr. Zundel has received adequate disclosure in this case.
    Mr. Zundel has received full disclosure consistent with section 78 of the
    Act. The disclosure was consistent with principles of natural justice and
    fairness. In fact, referring to paragraph 20 of my decision of January 21,
    2004, I indicated that there was, at the time of that decision, reasonable
    ground to believe that RM. Zundel was a danger to national security or to
    the safety of any person. I based my findings, at the time, on the fact that
    although Mr. Zundel had virtually no history or direct personal engagement
    in acts of serious violence, his status within the Right Supremacist
    Movement was such that adherents would be inspired to carry out his acts
    pursuant to his ideology. The Ministers believed that by his comportment as
    leader and ideologue, Mr. Zundel intended serious violence to be a
    consequence of his influence.  
    (28) In assessing carefully the evidence that was provided
    since that very decision of January 21, 2004, I have no hesitation to
    conclude that Mr. Zundel failed to provide evidence that there are no
    reasonable grounds to believe that he is a danger to nationals security or
    to the safety of any person. 
    (29) Being satisfied that Mr. Zundel should remain in
    detention because the Ministers have provided evidence that there are
    reasonable grounds to believe that he is a danger to national security or
    the safety of any person, it will not be necessary to determine whether he
    is unlikely to appear at a proceeding or for removal. No new evidence was
    even provided by any party regarding this question. 
    O R D E R 
    Therefore, THIS COURT ORDERS that: 
    Mr. Zundel's detention be continued in accordance with
    subsection 83(3) of the Act until the designated judge again rules in regard
    of the continuation of the detention. 
    "Pierre Blais", Judge 
      
	
    
      -  
 
      -  
 
      -  
 
     
     
	  |