- Amended Notice of Motion calling on Mr. Justice
        Pierre Balis to recuse (remove) himself from the Zundel case for a
        reasonable apprehension of bias.
 
        
      
     
      
    Court File No. DES-2-03 
    FEDERAL COURT 
    IN THE MATTER OF a certificate signed Pursuant to subsection
    77(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (the
    "Act") 
    AND IN THE MATTER OF the referral of that certificate to the
    Federal Court of Canada pursuant to subsection 77(1), sections 78 and 80 of
    the Act; 
    AND IN THE MATTER OF the detention of a permanent resident
    pursuant to subsection 83(1) of the Act; 
    AND IN THE MATTER OF Ernst ZUNDEL 
    AMENDED NOTICE OF MOTION 
    TAKE NOTICE THAT Ernst Zundel will make a motion to The
    Honourable Mr. Justice Blais on Tuesday, September 14, 2004 at 9:30 am
    during the hearing herein which is currently ongoing before His Lordship, or
    as soon after that time as the motion can be heard at 361 University Avenue,
    Toronto, Ontario. 
    THE MOTION IS FOR: 
    1. An order that Mr. Justice Blais recuse himself from this
    hearing on the grounds of a reasonable apprehension of bias; 
    2. An order that this recusal motion be heard and decided
    before the hearing continues; and 
    3. Such further and other relief as this Honourable Court
    deems just. 
    THE GROUNDS FOR THE MOTION ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
    A. Events on July 27, 2004 
    1. On July 27, 2004, Mr. Justice Blais made very strong
    negative comments, during the early examination-in-chief of Mr. Zundel¡¯s
    witness Doug Christie, about the alleged lack of value of Mr. Christie¡¯s
    evidence and about other matters pertaining to that evidence, which comments
    give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; 
    2. In particular, Mr. Justice Blais said, inter alia, the
    following during Mr Christie¡¯s evidence: 
    A. In stark contrast to his earlier comments about Mr.
    Zundel¡¯s counsel not subjecting CSIS witness David Stewart to any
    condescension, pressure or attitude, His Lordship interrupted the
    examination-in-chief of Mr. Christie to sarcastically ask Mr. Christie the
    following about the certificate summary, which had already been identified
    by Mr. Christie: 
    ¡°Do you know that this is the certificate summary?¡± 
    Ironically, the only person who had difficulty following
    when the certificate summary was earlier placed in front of Mr. Christie and
    identified by him, was His Lordship, not Mr. Christie. 
    B. His Lordship then directly asked Mr. Christie to violate
    solicitor-client privilege, by cross-examining Mr. Christie and by asking
    Mr. Christie the following about the certificate summary: 
    THE COURT: And the name of Mr. Tom Metzger is mentioned
    therein. You never discussed that with Mr. Zundel, is what you are
    saying?...My question is whether ¡°yes¡± or ¡°no¡± you discussed Tom
    Metzger¡¯s situation regarding this document? 
    C. His Lordship then incorrectly stated that Mr. Christie
    had testified that ¡°he [Mr. Christie] never discussed Mr. Tom Metzger
    with Mr. Zundel.¡± In fact, Mr. Christie had just testified that Mr.
    Zundel ¡°told me things about Mr. Metzger that reflected his views.¡± 
    D. Shortly thereafter, His Lordship then again misstated Mr.
    Christie¡¯s evidence, indicating that ¡°I am taking notes. When he says
    ¡® I didn¡¯t discuss with Mr. Zundel about Mr. Metzger¡¯, that
    is...¡±. 
    E. the following exchange then occurred: 
    Q. [by Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Christie] In the context of these
    discussions, you have said that they were non-solicitor/client discussions
    between you and Zundel; that Zundel expressed his opinions about Metzger.
    What was he expressing to you? A. Metzger made the news because of a
    Judgment in the United States, and Zundel¡¯s attitude was that Metzger was
    far too -- THE COURT: Excuse me. THE WITNESS: Yes, My Lord. THE COURT:
    Before we enter that territory, if this information is to have any value as
    evidence, it is important to know the extent to which those discussions
    stood at any time. If the question about all discussions about Mr. Metzger,
    in any context, is not going to be addressed, it is of no value whatsoever
    to talk about what was discussed years ago. MR. LINDSAY: I could say exactly
    the same thing about Mr. Stewart¡¯s evidence, where I wasn¡¯t able to
    get the full picture about Mr. Stewart¡¯s evidence -- THE COURT: I am
    sorry...? MR. MacINTOSH: I have an objection, Mr. Lord -- MR. LINDSAY: I am
    in the middle of my objection -- MR. MacINTOSH: Excuse me-- MR. LINDSAY:
    When I finish, perhaps my friend can -- MR. MacINTOSH: We don¡¯t need Mr.
    Lindsay¡¯s comments about other witnesses -- THE COURT: Yes. This is --
    MR. LINDSAY: This is a submission that is directly relevant to this witness,
    My Lord. THE COURT: Mr. Stewart was a member of the Secret Service, whose
    testimony was protected by another piece of legislation. We are not in the
    same context, at all. So don¡¯t mix apples and potatoes. We are far from
    there. MR. LINDSAY: It is a direct analogy, in my submission. But I won¡¯t
    -- THE COURT: It is obvious that it is not the same. We are talking about
    questions of solicitor-client privilege, and you are talking about a
    question of Mr. Stewart -- MR. LINDSAY: You are saying, My Lord, that if you
    only get half the story, then it is worthless. I should say, then that the
    entire proceeding against Mr. Zundel is worthless, because we only get half
    the story. THE COURT: Well, this is -- MR. LINDSAY: I get less than half the
    story. THE COURT: Excuse me. You, maybe, want to have only half of the story
    because I would be more than happy to know everything that was discussed
    between the witness and Mr. Zundel about Mr. Metzger. But that is not what
    you want. You just say: No, we should not talk about his discussions in
    respect of this document with Mr. Zundel. So, in a sense, who cares about
    one part of the story, if I cannot have access to the rest of it. (emphasis
    added) 
    His Lordship thus again interrupted Mr. Christie¡¯s
    evidence in chief. His Lordship suggested that the evidence of Mr. Christie
    about Mr. Metzger, which had barely began, may have ¡°no value
    whatsoever¡±. His Lordship then presumed that the discussions between
    Messrs Christie and Zundel about Mr. Metzger all took place ¡°years
    ago¡±. His Lordship then presumed that there was some different story told
    by Mr. Zundel to Mr. Christie about Mr. Metzger in the context of
    solicitor/client discussions during the security certificate review. His
    Lordship then presumed that that presumed different story given later was
    one that Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel now may want to suppress, thereby further
    denigrating Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel needlessly, as His Lordship has done
    many times in this hearing. His Lordship also suggested that, unless Mr
    Zundel waived solicitor/client privilege, ¡°who cares¡± about Mr.
    Christie¡¯s evidence. All of these actions by His Lordship give rise to a
    reasonable apprehension of bias; 
    B. General 
    3. Mr. Justice Blais¡¯ general conduct throughout this
    hearing, in the days prior to, including and after July 27, 2004, has also
    given rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; 
    C. Actions with respect to this Recusal Motion 
    4. His Lordship¡¯s expressed attitude toward this recusal
    motion also gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias in favour of the
    Crown; 
    5. Although the motion was brought in compliance with the
    Rules, His Lordship was immediately prepared during a conference call on
    August 6, 2004 to give the Crown more time to respond to the motion than was
    permitted by the Rules; 
    6. When the Crown indicated that it could properly respond
    to the motion by August 9, 2004, His Lordship instead gave the Crown until
    August 20, 2004 to respond. His Lordship thus gave the Crown more than three
    times the time which the Crown had asked for to respond to the motion. This
    is in stark contrast to the repeated hard time which His Lordship has given
    to Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel about the need to proceed expeditiously and about
    Mr. Zundel supposedly delaying the matter. For example, when Mr. Christie
    indicated a desire on July 27, 2004 to catch a plane and finish at 4 PM, His
    Lordship jumped to the erroneous conclusion that Mr. Christie was not even
    available for the whole day and, when challenged on the point, said to
    counsel for Mr Zundel, ¡°this is nonsense¡±. By contrast, when the Crown
    later suggested in a conference call on August 6, 2004 that Mr.
    Christie¡¯s evidence be moved up from the previously agreed date of August
    30, 2004 to August 9, 2004, the very day on which Mr. Christie¡¯s wife was
    having exploratory surgery regarding her ongoing battle with cancer, there
    was no meaningful rebuke from the Court. When the suggestion of Mr Christie
    testifying on August 9, 2004 didn¡¯t work, the Crown then suggested that
    Mr. Christie appear in court on August 10, 2004, the day after his wife¡¯s
    surgery. There was again no meaningful rebuke from the Court; 
    7. Although the Crown suggested on August 6, 2004 that it
    could file its materials by August 9, 2004, and August 10, 2004 was
    available to argue the recusal motion, the Court, on its own initiative,
    then pushed back the recusal motion to September 14, 2004, without anyone
    suggesting such a long delay. The Court thereby gave rise to the appearance
    that the Court is not dealing either expeditiously or seriously with the
    recusal motion; 
    8. On August 6, 2004, the Court also suggested that the
    notice of motion pertaining to recusal did not request that the motion be
    determined before the hearing proceeded, when such a practice would be a
    normal and entirely appropriate way in which an unbiased Court would deal
    with a recusal motion and was in fact the practice suggested by the Crown in
    this very case on an earlier recusal motion; 
    9. On August 6, 2004, the Court also wrongly suggested, on
    its own accord and without any request from the Crown or complaint by the
    Crown, that the recusal motion could be dismissed merely because of the lack
    of an affidavit in support of the motion. This suggestion was first made in
    a ruling, without even giving counsel an opportunity to make submissions on
    the point. Such gratitutious negative comments toward Mr. Zundel¡¯s
    defence only give rise to a further reasonable apprehension of bias; 
    D. Detention Order 
    10. Justice Blais indicated in his January 21, 2004 order to
    continue the detention of Mr. Zundel that the portion of the Crown's case
    which has been disclosed to Mr. Zundel might not be sufficient to find him a
    threat to national security. Justice Blais went on to hold that the secret
    evidence, on the other hand, had already convinced him that Mr. Zundel is
    actually a danger to national security and that Mr. Zundel¡¯s evidence
    should be disbelieved. Mr. Justice Blais thus appeared to decide more than
    that the certificate is reasonable. He appeared to pronounce that Mr. Zundel
    was actually a danger to the security of Canada, part way through Mr.
    Zundel¡¯s response. Since Justice Blais' finding, the Crown has not
    presented any further public evidence against Mr. Zundel; 
    E. Scope Allowed to Crown in Presentation of Its Evidence 
    11. It is respectfully submitted that the disparate
    approaches of Justice Blais to Crown evidence and Mr. Zundel¡¯s evidence
    throughout this hearing has given rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; 
    12. In particular, Justice Blais has given the Crown the
    widest possible latitude with respect to the Crown¡¯s evidence and has not
    even required, at times, proper proof of Crown evidence; 
    13. For example, the ¡°evidence¡± presented by the
    Minister and the Solicitor General and allowed by Mr. Justice Blais in this
    hearing consists of 5 volumes mainly of newspaper articles, other articles,
    website printouts, and similar materials written by people not called by the
    Minister or the Solicitor General as witnesses. Most of this
    ¡°evidence¡± is unsworn hearsay which is not subject to
    cross-examination. By contrast, the Minister and Solicitor General
    successfully objected when Mr. Zundel called an actual witness who referred
    to hearsay.; 
    14. At times, the source of the documents in the 5 volumes
    presented by the Minister and the Solicitor General has not even been
    explained to the Court. For example, on September 23, 2003, counsel for the
    Minister was cross-examining Mr. Zundel about a document. The Court asked
    counsel about the source of the document and did not get an answer. Instead,
    counsel simply continued questioning Mr. Zundel about other matters, without
    any concern whatsoever being expressed by the Court.; 
    15. Justice Blais used his discretion and allowed the Crown
    extremely wide scope in its cross-examination of Mr. Zundel. For example,
    the Crown was allowed to adduce evidence as to Mr. Zundel¡¯s view on
    Hitler's view on inter-racial marriages (which Justice Blais indicated was
    an "important question"); 
    16. Justice Blais further allowed the Crown to adduce into
    evidence, based on Mr. Zundel¡¯s unspecified sporadic contact at some
    unspecified time with one William Pierce, the fact that Pierce wrote a novel
    called the ¡°The Turner Diaries¡±, the fact that Timothy McVeigh¡¯s
    has much affection for the ¡°The Turner Diaries¡± and the fact that
    Timothy McVeigh caused the Oklahoma bombing. There was no suggestion that
    McVeigh ever had any contact directly or indirectly with Mr. Zundel. There
    is no evidence that Mr. Zundel is mentioned in "The Turner
    Diaries"; 
    F. Restricted Scope Allowed Mr. Zundel in Presentation of
    His Evidence 
    17. On the other hand, Justice Blais has been very
    restrictive in his approach with respect to Mr. Zundel¡¯s evidence and has
    often appeared to substantially interfere with Mr. Zundel¡¯s presentation
    of evidence. Justice Blais¡¯ approach to evidence led on behalf of Mr.
    Zundel, taken both on its own and in contrast with His Lordship¡¯s
    approach to the Crown¡¯s evidence, has given rise to a reasonable
    apprehension of bias; 
    18. For example, Justice Blais did not allow Mr. Zundel¡¯s
    counsel to cross-examine CSIS representative David Stewart on its failure to
    advise the Ministers that the Mr. Zundel¡¯s alleged implication in a
    German police raid described in CSIS materials in fact ended with his
    acquittal by the German court, unless Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel first
    established the basis for the question by producing first hand court
    document proving said facts, i.e. court record on Mr. Zundel¡¯s German
    charge and acquittal. Mr. Zundel¡¯s previous sworn testimony on the matter
    was held to be an insufficient foundation for the cross-examination to take
    place.; 
    19. Justice Blais also prevented Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel
    from questioning whether CSIS has checked the criminal history, if any, of
    one of the alleged white supremacists allegedly inspired to violence by Mr.
    Zundel into violence. As a result of this ruling, Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel
    was impeded from challenging CSIS' claim of even-handedness in its
    preparation of the materials submitted to the Ministers, who were deciding
    whether to issue a security certificate against Mr. Zundel; 
    20. By putting to the CSIS witness the following statement
    from a parliamentary report, Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel tried to discredit CSIS'
    fundamental premise that the white supremacist movement perpetrates
    terrorism and that Mr. Zundel inspires it: 
    After five years of investigating the extreme right, CSIS
    concluded in the 1990-1 TARC submission, that the ¡®investigations since
    1985 have documented the violence and petty criminal activity by skinheads
    and others but nothing that could be considered a threat to the security of
    Canada.¡¯ CSIS continued to investigate the extent to which the
    extreme-right constitutes a threat, by ¡®focusing on the leadership¡¯.
    (emphasis added) 
    This entire line of questioning was destroyed when Justice
    Blais repeatedly interjected and interrupted the cross-examination,
    insisting erroneously that Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel did not read out the
    entire paragraph to the witness, and insisting that the words "CSIS
    concluded" is not related to the lead-in phrase "After five years
    of investigating the extreme right" and therefore there was no evidence
    as to the basis on which CSIS made that conclusion.; 
    21. As CSIS essentially claims that the white supremacist
    movement is the weapon used by Mr. Zundel to perpetrate terrorism and
    thereby threaten national security, Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel lost an entire
    line of cross-examination which could have destroyed CSIS's entire case
    against Mr. Zundel, all due to Justice Blais' improper interference recorded
    in 25 pages of transcript in which Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel tried but failed
    to conduct the cross-examination amid Justice Blais' interference; 
    22. Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel was not allowed, during
    examination in chief of Mr. Zundel, to ask questions which Justice Blais
    erroneously held to be leading based on his definition of leading question
    as being all questions giving rise to a "yes" or "no"
    answer. The late Justice Sopinka disagreed with this test and wrote ¡°many
    questions can be answered by ¡°yes¡± or ¡°no¡± that are not
    leading¡±. Instead, Justice Sopinka defined a leading question as one
    which ¡°suggests the answer¡± or "assumes a fact or a state of
    facts which is in dispute¡±. 
    Mr Justice Sopinka et al., The Law of Evidence in Canada, p.
    909-910 
    23. Subsection 78(b) of IRPA stipulates that otherwise
    pertinent information should not be disclosed to Mr. Zundel if to do so
    "would be" injurious to national security. Justice Blais
    repeatedly disallowed questions on the basis that they require disclosure of
    information which "could be" injurious to national security. The
    erroneous test was applied over Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel's objection.; 
    24. Based on ¡°national security¡±, Justice Blais made a
    wholesale advance ruling that the Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel may not ask the
    CSIS agent any question ¡°directed at¡± any classified information. This
    ruling is inconsistent with CSIS agent's previous conduct during
    cross-examination where he volunteered answers directed at classified
    materials such as ¡°classified materials will allow a different
    response¡±. In one case, he went further and directed his answer to
    classified information indicating that CSIS has classified information on
    someone allegedly associated with Mr. Zundel. He said that such classified
    information shows this person¡¯s involvement in the white supremacist
    movement, which he admitted was not supported by the unclassified
    information.; 
    25. Following the above ruling, the Court then disallowed,
    on the ground of national security, all questions whether CSIS has any
    unclassified evidence that Mr. Zundel was ever involved in any violence or
    acts or terrorism anywhere. This shut down the entire inquiry into the heart
    of CSIS's public case against Mr. Zundel, namely, that he perpetrates
    terrorism not by his personal acts, but by inspiring people in the white
    supremacist movement; 
    26. Justice Blais then further disallowed on the ground of
    national security the following question: 
    Limiting yourself to the unclassified information, are you
    able to point to one example of political violence inspired by Zundel? 
    27. These lines of inquiry are central to challenging the
    heart of CSIS' case against Mr. Zundel. The questions asked clearly relate
    to the publicly disclosed materials and the answers to them can in no way
    jeopardize national security. Yet Justice Blais disallowed them all out of
    his, respectfully, misguided and unchecked concept of "national
    security". These questions all go to the heart of the Crown¡¯s case
    against Mr. Zundel, which is perpetration of terrorism through others. When
    they are disallowed, Mr. Zundel¡¯s right to a fair hearing and the entire
    fact finding process are both devastated. Such judicial conduct gives rise
    to a reasonable apprehension of bias; 
    28. Justice Blais¡¯s advance ruling came after he
    threatened to terminate cross-examination if his previous rulings were not
    followed. This sweeping advance ruling, coupled with the threat of
    terminating Mr. Zundel¡¯s right to cross-examine the only witness produced
    by the Crown (produced only when compelled by Mr. Zundel by way of motion),
    crippled Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel¡¯s ability to probe the Crown¡¯s
    evidence and gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; 
    29. Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel was thus obliged to stay far
    from the perceived limit Justice Blais dictated by including the prohibition
    against questions regarding unclassified materials. It is respectfully
    submitted that such working conditions are patently unfair to Mr.
    Zundel¡¯s counsel, irreparably compromise the fact finding process and
    give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; 
    G. Appearance of Different Treatment of the Crown (and its
    witnesses) and Mr. Zundel (and his counsel and witnesses) 
    30. Throughout the hearing, Justice Blais has made
    disparaging remarks about Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel, characterizing his
    cross-examination of the CSIS agent as playing games, being tricky, trying
    things that were smart but against the law and criticized his
    cross-examination as condescending, lecturing the witness, lecturing the
    Court, wasting time and his demeanour as nervous, despite Mr. Zundel¡¯s
    counsel's objection to the comment. Justice Blais also told Mr. Zundel¡¯s
    counsel to be more polite. During one hearing date, Justice Blais so
    interfered with Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel¡¯s submissions that His Lordship
    himself felt, after the lunch recess, compelled to apologize for his conduct
    towards Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel. Such conduct is inappropriate as
    acknowledged by Justice Blais himself. Its occurrence despite His
    Lordship¡¯s own after-the-fact recognition of its impropriety raises very
    serious questions of reasonable apprehension of bias, particularly creating
    an appearance that His Lordship cannot help himself from favouring the
    Crown; 
    31. As detailed above, Justice Blais appeared to pre-judge
    in strong negative terms the evidence of Mr. Zundel¡¯s witness Mr.
    Christie early in his examination-in-chief; 
    32. On the other hand, Justice Blais repeatedly complimented
    the CSIS agent during his cross-examination as being "frank" and
    "co-operative" and directed Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel not to
    "subject the witness to condescension, any pressure or attitude"; 
    26. In two separate rulings, Justice Blais has erroneously
    said that Mr. Zundel¡¯s counsel did not make certain submissions, when
    counsel clearly made exactly those submissions; 
    27. On many matters, there appear to be two standards: one
    for the Crown and one for the defence. For example, the Crown has scheduled
    dates then cancelled them without receiving any criticism. The Crown witness
    was unavailable on potential continuation dates and the Court said nothing
    critical. On the other hand, when counsel for 65-year-old Mr. Zundel wanted
    to finish early because Mr. Zundel was fatigued, the Court was highly
    critical. When Mr. Zundel¡¯s witness Mr. Christie became unavailable due
    to his wife¡¯s surgery, the Court was highly critical; and 
    28. Such further and other grounds and counsel may advise
    and this Honourable Court may permit. 
    THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE will be used at the
    hearing of the motion: 
    1. Transcripts herein; 2. Pleadings herein; and 3. Such
    further and other evidence as counsel may advise and this Honourable Court
    may permit. 
    Date: August 17, 2004 
    ___________________________ PETER LINDSAY Barrister and
    Solicitor 233 Sheppard Avenue West Toronto, Ontario M2N 1N2 LSUC Reg. No.
    Tel: (416)733-3313 Fax: (416)733-3433 
    Solicitor for Ernst Zundel 
     
     
      
     
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